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What is punishment? It is the infliction of pain, sorrow, and grief. To take 
a child from the comfort of his home, the joy of his companions and the freedom 
of field, river and wood, and confine him to a building with white-washed walls, 
regimented routine and institutional hours is punishment in the strictest sense of 
the word.1 
On the morning of February 20, 2009, twenty-six-year-old Kenzie Houk was 
shot in the back of the head while she was sleeping in her home in rural western 
Pennsylvania.2 The victim, who was eight-and-a-half-months pregnant, died of the 
single shotgun wound to the back of her head and neck.3 Her viable fetus died due 
to lack of oxygen.4 There was no indication of any provocation on the part of the 
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1 In re Holmes, 109 A.2d 523, 530 (Pa. 1954) (Musmanno, J., dissenting). 
2 Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 320 of 2009, CR, OTN: K843595-4, 2010 WL 5763593, at *1 (C.P. 
Lawrence Mar. 29, 2010), vacated, 26 A.3d 485 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) [hereinafter Brown I]. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
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victim.5 The Commonwealth established evidence suggesting that the suspect 
removed the spent shell casing, returned the shotgun to a bedroom in the home, and 
left, depositing the shell casing along a pathway in the driveway.6 A ballistics 
report later revealed that the shell was fired from the suspect’s shotgun, and 
gunpowder residue was found on the shirt that he was wearing on the day of the 
shooting.7 Following the incident, the defendant was charged with criminal 
homicide8 and homicide of an unborn child.9 
Jordan Brown was much like any other fifth-grade boy. He attended school, 
participated in sports, and enjoyed reading and hunting with his father.10 However, 
there is something drastically different between Jordan and other children his age. 
Unlike those children, Jordan does not reside with his family in western 
Pennsylvania. Instead, since 2009, he has called the Edmund L. Thomas 
Adolescent Detention Center his home.11 At the age of eleven, Jordan was charged 
with the above-described murder of his father’s fiancée, Kenzie Houk.12 In 
Pennsylvania, the criminal court system has original jurisdiction over murders; 
therefore, Jordan moved to have his case transferred to juvenile court.13 The 
Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas ruled that Jordan failed to prove that his 
case (Brown I) should be transferred to juvenile court as required by the 
Pennsylvania Juvenile Act.14 As a result, he would be tried as an adult in criminal 
proceedings. Had he been convicted, Jordan Brown would have been the youngest 
person in the United States to be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, the 
mandatory sentence for the crimes with which he was charged.15 In March 2011, 
                                                           
 
5 Id. at *3. 
6 Id. at *1. 
7 Id. at *3. 
8 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2501 (2006). 
9 Id. § 2603; Brown I, 2010 WL 5763593, at *1. 
10 Jordan’s Family, SAVE JORDAN BROWN, http://jordanbrowntrust.org/family.html (last visited Oct. 20, 
2012). 
11 See Stephanie Chen, Boy, 12, Faces Grown Up Murder Charges, CNN (Feb. 10, 2010), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-02-10/justice/pennsylvania.young.murder.defendant_1_juvenile-homicide-
jordan-s-attorneys?_s=PM:CRIME. 
12 Brown I, 2010 WL 5763593, at *1. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at *7. 
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the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated and remanded the case on appeal, 
finding that Brown’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination had been 
violated due to improper application of the statute by the trial court.16 In August 
2011, the trial court reversed its earlier decision and transferred Jordan Brown’s 
case to the juvenile division of the court.17 
The ruling that Jordan Brown would be tried as an adult was controversial on 
its face, as Jordan was only eleven years old when he allegedly committed the 
crime. While some criticized the trial court judge for ruling that an eleven-year-old 
must stand trial as an adult,18 those criticisms were specious, as the judge did 
properly apply the law. There is a more fundamental problem. Many transfer 
hearings, also known as “decertification hearings,” often boil down to whether the 
juvenile is amenable to treatment in the juvenile facility.19 As in Jordan Brown’s 
case, it seemed that in order to show amenability to treatment, the child must have 
had to take responsibility for the crime. As noted in Brown I, “[T]he first step 
towards rehabilitation is to take responsibility for the underlying offense.”20 In 
cases such as these, it is not the reasoning of the courts that is flawed, but the law 
itself. Pennsylvania’s juvenile transfer statute puts the child in a type of catch-22: 
admit to the crime and be tried as a juvenile or maintain innocence and be tried in 
the adult criminal justice system. Therefore, while the Superior Court’s ruling in 
Brown’s case was beneficial to him, it will not stop the problem from recurring in 
other juvenile cases. The Pennsylvania legislature should take steps to reform the 
statute or insert additional safeguards so that the Fifth Amendment rights of 
juveniles are not compromised in transfer proceedings. 
Part II of this note will discuss the history of the juvenile system and the 
juvenile transfer mechanism. Part III will examine the current statutory and case 
                                                                                                                                      
 
15 Brief for Appellant at 26, Commonwealth v. Brown, 26 A.3d 485 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (No. 1159 
WDA 2010), 2010 WL 6546796 at *26. 
16 Commonwealth v. Brown, 26 A.3d 485, 510 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011). 
17 Commonwealth v. Brown, No. 320 of 2009, CR, OTN: K843595-4, at 1 (C.P. Lawrence Aug. 23, 
2011) [hereinafter Brown II]. 
18 See, e.g., Andrea Canning & Maggie Burbank, Jordan Brown Murder Case Takes Emotional Toll, 
ABC NIGHTLINE (Apr. 28, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/jordan-brown-murder-case-12-year-
adult/story?id=10288704&page=3#.TwSvZxyofV8 (“I think the judge’s decision in this case is both 
disappointing, and I think, misinformed . . . . The judge is saying in order to be tried as a juvenile you 
need to admit that you’ve done the crime. That doesn’t seem quite right to me.”). 
19 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(G) (2006). 
20 Brown I, 2010 WL 5763593, at *6. 
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law governing juvenile transfers to and from the criminal system in Pennsylvania. 
Part IV of this note will demonstrate, through Pennsylvania case law and that of 
other jurisdictions with similar statutes, that the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act is 
flawed, as it implicitly requires juveniles to admit guilt without immunizing those 
incriminating statements from use in decertification proceedings. Finally, Part V 
will examine the implications of reforming the Juvenile Act. This note will argue 
that public policy merits these changes, even though it may mean that fewer 
juveniles are tried in the adult criminal system. 
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
A. The History of the Juvenile Court 
The juvenile court first emerged in 1899 in Chicago, Illinois.21 It differed 
from the criminal system in various ways, but the most significant difference 
between the two systems was their respective goals. While the criminal court 
system focused mainly on traditional retribution with the goal of punishment, the 
purpose of the juvenile system was to rehabilitate children and to “prevent them 
from entering a lifetime of crime.”22 The focus was on the juvenile as an individual 
and, thus, on providing him or her with individualized services and treatment.23 
At its inception, juvenile jurisdiction was based on the doctrine of parens 
patriae, which describes the role of the state as “guardian of persons under legal 
disability,” such as juveniles.24 Therefore, the juvenile offender was seen as 
needing the state’s care, guidance, and help in rehabilitation.25 The ultimate 
philosophy of the juvenile system was that: 
[T]he child who has begun to go wrong, who is incorrigible, who has broken a 
law or an ordinance, is to be taken in hand by the state, not as an enemy but as a 
protector, as the ultimate guardian, because either the unwillingness or inability 
                                                           
 
21 Lisa A. Cintron, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile Transfers to Adult 
Criminal Court, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1254, 1257 (1996); Catherine R. Guttman, Listen to the Children: 
The Decision to Transfer Juveniles to Adult Court, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507, 511 (1995). 
22 Francis Barry McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court Reform: The Case for 
Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 629, 641 (1994). 
23 Cintron, supra note 21, at 1257. 
24 Guttman, supra note 21, at 511. 
25 Cintron, supra note 21, at 1258. 
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of the natural parents to guide it toward good citizenship has compelled the 
intervention of the public authorities.26 
The rationale behind the rehabilitative approach stemmed from the beliefs of 
nineteenth-century common law and society that children were not fully 
responsible for their actions.27 Therefore, they “should be shielded from the 
punishment that would be exacted from a responsible actor,” in other words, an 
adult.28 Thus, the juvenile court was made as a separate forum to address the 
special needs of children with a heavy emphasis on social and psychological 
inquiries.29 Moreover, judges had broad discretion to make decisions that were 
considered to be in the best interest of the child.30 
Another difference in the goals of the criminal and juvenile systems was 
marked by the juvenile system’s attempts to eliminate the stigma of 
criminalization.31 For example, instead of declaring the child “convicted” or 
“guilty,” the juvenile would be adjudicated “delinquent” or “in need of the court’s 
help”; the juvenile offender was not labeled a criminal, but was labeled 
“delinquent”; the proceedings were private, unlike the public proceedings of a 
criminal trial; and finally, the proceedings were considered civil and not criminal in 
nature.32 Each of these elements of the juvenile system was consistent with the goal 
of rehabilitation and made the process less adversarial. The nature of the juvenile 
system also allowed the child to re-enter society afresh.33 Simply stated, the 
juvenile system was designed to provide whatever was necessary to give children 
another chance.34 
The original scope of the juvenile system was somewhat limited and not 
intended to deal with major offenders, as evidenced by the Illinois Juvenile Court 
                                                           
 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 1258–59. 
28 McCarthy, supra note 22, at 641. 
29 Guttman, supra note 21, at 512. 
30 Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 
MINN. L. REV. 965, 971 (1995). 
31 Guttman, supra note 21, at 511. 
32 Cintron, supra note 21, at 1259; Guttman, supra note 21, at 511. 
33 Guttman, supra note 21, at 511. 
34 Id. at 512. 
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Act,35 one of the first American juvenile acts.36 Instead, the intent was to deal with 
minor offenders who had the potential for future criminal behavior.37 From there, 
however, the scope of juvenile acts across the country began to expand. By 1933, 
the Pennsylvania juvenile court had original jurisdiction over all crimes committed 
within the Commonwealth by children under the age of sixteen, except for 
murder.38 
The juvenile system continued to evolve procedurally as well. In the case In 
re Gault,39 the United States Supreme Court held that juveniles were to be afforded 
certain procedural due process rights, such as the right to notice of charges, to 
counsel, to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and to the privilege 
against self-incrimination.40 The Court in Gault noted that the denial of procedural 
rights frequently resulted in arbitrariness rather than the juvenile system’s 
proclaimed goal of “careful, compassionate, individualized treatment.”41 
Furthermore, three years later in In re Winship,42 the Supreme Court held that 
a finding of “delinquency” must be made beyond a reasonable doubt, instead of the 
lower, civil standard of a preponderance of the evidence.43 The addition of these 
procedural rights altered the original form of juvenile proceedings, making them 
more formal and adversarial.44 Along with the procedural changes came the 
modern notion that the goal of the juvenile court should be to hold juveniles 
accountable for their actions; thus, the rehabilitative approach has been somewhat 
abandoned in favor of an expansion of the scope and authority of the juvenile 
justice system.45 
                                                           
 
35 Act of April 21, 1899, 1899 Ill. Laws 131–32. 
36 McCarthy, supra note 22, at 643. 
37 Id. at 642–44. 
38 Id. at 645. 
39 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
40 See id. 
41 Feld, supra note 30, at 971–72 (quoting Gault, 387 U.S. at 18). 
42 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970). 
43 See id. 
44 Cintron, supra note 21, at 1260. 
45 McCarthy, supra note 22, at 641–42. 
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B. The Juvenile Transfer Mechanism 
Initially, transfers from juvenile court to criminal court were the exception; 
however, they have become increasingly common today.46 The rationale behind the 
originally limited use of the transfer mechanism was that “children should be 
protected and rehabilitated rather than subjected to the harshness of the criminal 
system because children, all children, are worth redeeming.”47 In those extenuating 
circumstances, however, when the transfer mechanism was necessary, courts 
employed it where the juvenile offender was not found to be amenable to treatment 
in the juvenile system.48 In Kent v. United States,49 the United States Supreme 
Court set out factors for courts to consider in assessing whether the juvenile’s case 
should be transferred,50 noting that the transfer decision is “critically important,” as 
                                                           
 
46 Cintron, supra note 21, at 1261; Guttman, supra note 21, at 515. 
47 Cintron, supra note 21, at 1261 (internal citations omitted). 
48 Id. at 1257. 
49 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
50 The factors listed by the Kent Court were:  
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the 
protection of the community requires waiver. 
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated or willful manner. 
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, 
greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal 
injury resulted. 
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence 
upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment (to be 
determined by consultation with the United States Attorney). 
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court 
when the juvenile’s associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be 
charged with a crime in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. 
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by 
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and 
pattern of living. 
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous 
contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, 
juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to this 
Court, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions. 
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of 
reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the 
alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently 
available to the Juvenile Court.  
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566–67 (1966). 
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it determines the juvenile’s relationship with the criminal justice system and greatly 
affects his future.51 Indeed, the decision of whether to transfer the case affects more 
than just the forum. It determines whether the juvenile will be afforded the “special 
rights and immunities” of juvenile court and whether he will come away with an 
adult criminal conviction and all of the accompanying consequences.52 
III. CURRENT PENNSYLVANIA LAW GOVERNING JUVENILE 
TRANSFERS 
The Pennsylvania Juvenile Act53 governs transfers from criminal court to 
juvenile court in Pennsylvania.54 The self-proclaimed purpose of the Act is to 
“provide for children committing delinquent acts programs of supervision, care and 
rehabilitation which provide balanced attention to the protection of the community, 
the imposition of accountability for offenses committed and the development of 
competencies to enable children to become responsible and productive members of 
the community.”55 Pennsylvania employs a form of legislative waiver that 
automatically excludes juveniles charged with certain crimes from the juvenile 
court and directly transfers them to the adult court.56 The criminal court, for 
instance, has original jurisdiction over acts of murder.57 Additionally, there are 
several other offenses enumerated in § 6302 that do not constitute “delinquent acts” 
and, thus, give the criminal court original jurisdiction.58 Section 6322 goes on to 
state that in determining whether to transfer a case charging murder, or any of the 
offenses excluded from the definition of “delinquent act,” the burden of proof is 
upon the juvenile to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer 
                                                           
 
51 Kent, 383 U.S. at 560; see also Guttman, supra note 21, at 513–14. 
52 Cintron, supra note 21, at 1261 (quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 556). 
53 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 6301–6375 (2006). 
54 Id. § 6355. 
55 Id. § 6301(b)(2). 
56 Cintron, supra note 21, at 1267–68. 
57 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6322 (2006). 
58 Those offenses include conduct where the child was fifteen years or older at the time and a deadly 
weapon was used during a rape, involuntary deviant sexual intercourse, aggravated assault, robbery, 
robbery of a motor vehicle, aggravated indecent assault, kidnapping, voluntary manslaughter, or 
attempt, conspiracy or solicitation to commit murder or any of these crimes. Additionally, a child will be 
subject to criminal proceedings if he was fifteen years or older and had been previously adjudicated 
delinquent of any of the above-mentioned conduct. Summary offenses do not constitute “delinquent 
acts.” 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 (2006). 
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will serve the public interest.59 In determining whether the child has satisfied his 
burden, the court is to consider the factors set forth in § 6355(a)(4)(iii).60 
Section 6355(a)(4) states that the court may transfer the case from juvenile to 
criminal court if there is a prima facie case that the child committed the delinquent 
act alleged, it would be a felony if committed by an adult, there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the public interest is served by the transfer of the case for 
criminal prosecution, and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child is 
not mentally retarded or mentally ill.61 In determining whether the public interest 
will be served, the court shall consider several factors,62 the most contentious of 
which is typically “whether the child is amenable to treatment, supervision or 
rehabilitation as a juvenile.”63 It should be noted that once the juvenile’s case is 
vested in the criminal court, “the public policies affording a juvenile different 
                                                           
 
59 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6322(a). 
60 See infra note 62. 
61 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6355(a)(4) (2006). 
62 The full list of factors is: 
(A) the impact of the offense on the victim or victims; 
(B) the impact of the offense on the community; 
(C) the threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed by the child; 
(D) the nature and circumstances of the offense allegedly committed by the 
child; 
(E) the degree of the child’s culpability; 
(F) the adequacy and duration of dispositional alternatives available under 
this chapter and in the adult criminal justice system; and 
(G) whether the child is amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation 
as a juvenile by considering the following factors: 
(I) age; 
(II) mental capacity; 
(III) maturity; 
(IV) the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the 
child; 
(V) previous records, if any; 
(VI) the nature and extent of any prior delinquent history, 
including the success or failure of any previous attempts by the 
juvenile court to rehabilitate the child; 
(VII) whether the child can be rehabilitated prior to the 
expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction; 
(VIII) probation or institutional reports, if any; 
(IX) any other relevant factors. 
Id. § 6355(a)(4)(iii). 
63 Id. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(G). 
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treatment than adults are no longer applicable.”64 Additionally, the criminal court, 
in deciding whether to decertify a case to juvenile court, must consider all of the 
statutory factors set forth in § 6355(a)(4)(iii); however, the Juvenile Act is “silent 
as to the weight [to] be assessed to each [factor] by the court.”65 
IV. FLAWS IN THE PENNSYLVANIA JUVENILE TRANSFER 
STATUTE 
A. The Act Implicitly Requires an Admission of Guilt for 
Decertification to Juvenile Court 
The landmark juvenile transfer case in Pennsylvania is Commonwealth v. 
Pyle,66 in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that “where murder is 
charged, treatment as a ‘youthful offender’ still does not arise as a matter of 
right.”67 While Pyle was decided before the current form of the Juvenile Act was 
enacted, it is still cited by courts reviewing transfer decisions.68 Since the Act’s 
1995 amendment,69 Pennsylvania courts have uniformly applied the seven-factor 
test set forth in § 6355(a)(4)(iii). The standard of review for appealing a 
decertification decision is a particularly heavy burden for the juvenile to overcome. 
As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted in In re E.F.,70 the “ultimate decision 
of whether to certify a minor to stand trial as an adult is within the sole discretion 
of a juvenile court. An appellate court may not disturb a certification ruling unless 
the juvenile court committed an abuse of discretion.”71 
In Jordan Brown’s case, the trial court evaluated whether he could be 
rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.72 In support 
of its contention that Brown was not amenable to rehabilitation, the 
                                                           
 
64 Commonwealth v. Carter, 855 A.2d 885, 891 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). 
65 Commonwealth v. Sanders, 814 A.2d 1248, 1251 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 
66 342 A.2d 101 (Pa. 1975). 
67 Id. at 104. 
68 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Aziz, 724 A.2d 371, 375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999); Commonwealth v. Cotto, 
708 A.2d 806, 813 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Commonwealth v. Behr, 43 Pa. D. & C.3d 27, 32 (C.P. Erie 
1987). 
69 See Cotto, 708 A.2d at 811. 
70 995 A.2d 326 (Pa. 2010). 
71 Id. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 722 A.2d 1030, 1032, 1034 (Pa. 1999)). 
72 See Brown I, 2010 WL 5763593, at *1. 
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Commonwealth presented the testimony of Dr. John O’Brien, a physician-
psychiatrist.73 Dr. O’Brien found that the defendant’s “amenability to rehabilitation 
is limited because of [the] tendency to minimize, to deny and to shift blame and 
that the first step towards rehabilitation cannot be taken unless [the defendant] 
would come forward and take responsibility for his actions, which is not likely to 
occur.”74 
The trial court ultimately held that Brown was not likely to be rehabilitated.75 
While the court noted that it was not concluding as a matter of law that the child 
must confess,76 it stated: 
[W]e find agreement on the conclusion that rehabilitation requires taking 
responsibility for the underlying offense; and, persuasive reasoning from 
Dr. O’Brien that the taking of such responsibility is unlikely to occur, thus 
making the prospects of rehabilitation within the confines of the juvenile court 
jurisdiction likely to be unsuccessful.77 
Therefore, after considering the factors of § 6355(a)(4)(iii) and finding that, 
under § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(G), Brown would not likely be rehabilitated in the juvenile 
system, the court held that he failed to meet his burden of proving that a transfer to 
juvenile court would serve the public interest.78 
As illustrated by Jordan Brown’s case, the Pennsylvania transfer statute 
essentially requires the juvenile to admit to committing the crime in order to be 
decertified to juvenile court. The juvenile must take responsibility for his actions 
and show remorse, but the situation becomes complicated where the juvenile did 
not commit the crime. This is where the Hobson’s choice79 arises for the juvenile. 
The child must show that he is amenable to treatment in the juvenile facility in 
order to be tried in juvenile court. In Jordan Brown’s case, he insisted that he did 
                                                           
 
73 Id. at *5. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at *6. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at *7. 
79 A “Hobson’s choice” is “an apparently free choice that actually offers no alternative.” Hobson’s 
Choice, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/hobson’s+choice (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2012). 
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not commit the crime, while at the same time asserting that he was amenable to 
treatment in the juvenile facility in order to have his case decertified.80 However, if 
he did not commit the crime, why would he need treatment? The Pennsylvania 
Juvenile Act puts juveniles like Jordan Brown in this difficult and illogical 
position. 
Prior juvenile transfer challenges in Pennsylvania did not come to this. Often, 
courts rested their decisions to uphold the denial of transfer on other grounds, 
rather than on whether the juvenile pled guilty or maintained his innocence. One 
oft-stated basis that courts use to find that the juvenile was properly placed in the 
adult system is his age. Often times, the older the juvenile is, the less likely it is that 
the court will find that he can be rehabilitated before the expiration of the juvenile 
court’s jurisdiction, which occurs at age twenty-one.81 By making age the main 
focus of the decision, the court does not have to make the fact that the juvenile 
maintained his innocence a central issue. In other cases, such considerations as 
insufficient time for rehabilitation in the juvenile system for older juveniles and 
defendants’ prior criminal or juvenile record have influenced courts to uphold 
denials of decertification.82 The prior offenses show that the juvenile system has 
previously failed in attempting to rehabilitate the child. 
                                                           
 
80 See generally Brown I. 
81 See Commonwealth v. Moyer, 444 A.2d 101 (Pa. 1982) (holding that the twenty-year-old defendant 
was not likely to be rehabilitated in one year); Commonwealth v. Sourbeer, 422 A.2d 116 (Pa. 1980) 
(relying on psychiatrist’s testimony that the fifteen-year-old defendant would not likely be rehabilitated 
until ages thirty-five to forty); Commonwealth v. Pyle, 342 A.2d 101 (Pa. 1975) (holding that the 
seventeen-year-old defendant could not be rehabilitated by age twenty-one); Commonwealth v. Zoller, 
498 A.2d 436 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (concluding that five years in the juvenile system was not sufficient 
to rehabilitate the defendants); Commonwealth v. Caraballo, 12 Pa. D. & C.5th 17 (C.P. Berks 2010) 
(holding that the defendant, aged twenty years, five months, could not be rehabilitated before the 
expiration of juvenile court jurisdiction). 
82 See Commonwealth v. Pennington, 751 A.2d 212 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (finding that a nineteen-year-
old defendant with prior offenses could not be rehabilitated before juvenile jurisdiction expired); 
Commonwealth v. Aziz, 724 A.2d 371 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (concluding that the case of a seventeen-
year-old defendant with prior offenses, exhibiting a history of violent, criminal behavior should not be 
decertified to juvenile court); Commonwealth v. Morningwake, 595 A.2d 158 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) 
(holding that the nearly sixteen-year-old defendant charged with first degree murder could not be 
rehabilitated by the time juvenile jurisdiction expired, and that prior crimes were suggestive of 
unsuccessful rehabilitation in the juvenile center); Commonwealth v. Leatherbury, 568 A.2d 1313 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1990) (noting that only three years in the juvenile facility would not be enough to rehabilitate 
and that previous attempts to rehabilitate had proven unsuccessful). 
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Additionally, similar to Jordan Brown’s case, courts have also based denials 
of decertification on the fact that the defendant showed no remorse.83 For example, 
in Commonwealth v. Kocher,84 in which a nine-year-old boy was charged with 
murdering his neighbor, the child was found to have demonstrated a lack of 
remorse by dozing off to sleep during pretrial motions.85 The lower court denied 
Kocher’s motion for transfer to the juvenile court.86 Alternatively, if the defendant 
takes responsibility for his actions, admits to the crime, and shows remorse, 
Pennsylvania courts have tended to find that he is amenable to treatment in the 
juvenile facility.87 In Commonwealth v. Behr, after the victim had taunted the 
fifteen-year-old defendant, the defendant went into his house, came out with a 
shotgun and shot the victim three times, killing him.88 Among the reasons the Court 
of Common Pleas of Erie County cited for decertifying the case to juvenile court 
were that the defendant was not mature or strong enough to survive in the adult 
system,89 he never had problems in school nor did he have prior offenses,90 he 
showed great remorse for the victim,91 and he understood the enormity and horror 
of the shooting.92 Moreover, because the defendant could be rehabilitated before 
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction expired, the court decertified his case to the 
juvenile court.93 
                                                           
 
83 See Commonwealth v. Smith, 950 A.2d 327, 329 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (defendant apologized “half-
heartedly” to his victim, refusing to take responsibility for his actions); Commonwealth v. Zoller, 498 
A.2d 436, 440 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (holding that defendants showed no remorse and “hardness of 
heart” after luring a mentally retarded man to a pre-dug grave, beating him over the head with the 
shovel, robbing him, and dragging him into the grave, where he was found dead two months later). 
84 Commonwealth v. Kocher, 602 A.2d 1308 (Pa. 1992). 
85 Robert Schwartz, Kids Should Never Be Tried As Adults, CNN (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2010/OPINION/02/18/schwartz.kids.trials/index.html. 
86 Kocher, 602 A.2d at 1313. The lower court was reversed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for 
erroneously finding that a juvenile murder defendant is required to prove that a mental disease or defect 
caused the killing in order to demonstrate amenability to treatment in the juvenile system. Id. at 1315. 
87 See, e.g., In re E.F., 995 A.2d 326 (Pa. 2010) (holding that a twenty-one-year-old defendant who was 
charged with sexual assault of a child when he was twelve years old and who admitted to the crime had 
rehabilitated himself between the ages of twelve and twenty-one). 
88 Commonwealth v. Behr, 43 Pa. D. & C.3d 27 (C.P. Erie 1987). 
89 Id. at 38. 
90 Id. at 39–40. 
91 Id. at 42. 
92 Id. at 50. 
93 Id. at 55–56. 
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In contrast, Jordan Brown had no prior offenses94 and he was twelve years old 
at the time of the decertification hearing, leaving nine years for potential 
rehabilitation in the juvenile center.95 While he may not have shown remorse for 
the victim, this was due to the fact that he maintained his innocence. Therefore, the 
trial court in Brown I seemed to treat as dispositive the fact that Jordan would not 
take responsibility for his actions.  
The Supreme Court of California, in a case involving a similar statute and 
similar predicament, found that its juvenile transfer statute violated juveniles’ Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination due to the untenable choice they were 
forced to make. The court likened the juvenile in a decertification hearing to a 
probationer, noting that a “policy underlying the privilege against self-
incrimination which is undermined by forcing a probationer to choose between the 
privilege and his opportunity to be heard at his revocation hearing is our 
‘unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-
accusation, perjury or contempt.’”96 The court conceded that although a minor is 
not faced with contempt if he remains silent at his decertification hearing, he may 
find himself in a similar situation.97 
The consequences of this trilemma could be devastating for the juvenile: 
He might . . . seriously incriminate himself if he exercises his right to be heard, 
particularly where his testimony would consist of a truthful explanation of 
mitigating circumstances surrounding the charged [offense]. If he remains silent 
he not only loses his opportunity to present a conceivably convincing case [for 
treatment under the juvenile court laws] but also incurs the risk that 
notwithstanding the ideals of the Fifth Amendment, his silence will be taken as 
an indication that there are no valid reasons why [he should not be tried as an 
adult]. To avoid the adverse effects of the foregoing alternatives, the [minor] 
may be tempted to testify falsely in a manner which will not damage his defense 
at a subsequent criminal trial. To force an individual to choose one of three such 
                                                           
 
94 Brown I, 2010 WL 5763593, at *4. 
95 Id. 
96 Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 693 P.2d 789, 794 (Cal. 1985) (citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 
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unpalatable alternatives runs counter to our historic aversion to cruelty reflected 
in the privilege against self-incrimination.98 
Therefore, while the Pennsylvania statute does not explicitly require that a 
juvenile admit to the crime to be decertified to juvenile court, it does so implicitly. 
Juveniles in Pennsylvania who wish to maintain their innocence are thus subjected 
to the “cruel trilemma” of which the California Supreme Court spoke.99 For this 
reason, the determination of amenability in the juvenile court system should not be 
based on whether the juvenile has taken responsibility for his actions or admitted to 
the crime. Instead, and more appropriately, Pennsylvania courts should focus on 
factors such as the defendant’s age and prior history within the juvenile system in 
determining amenability. 
B. There Is No Immunity Provision in the Pennsylvania Juvenile 
Act to Protect the Juvenile’s Right Against Self-
Incrimination During Transfer Proceedings 
Another constitutional safeguard is providing juveniles with use immunity for 
statements made during transfer proceedings. Courts across the United States have 
found that requiring a juvenile to make the unfair choice that Jordan Brown had to 
make, without the assurance that the statement would be inadmissible for use in 
transfer proceedings or in a subsequent trial, violates the child’s Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination.100 While Pennsylvania does have a provision which 
gives immunity to a juvenile’s statements from being used in a subsequent trial, it 
does not protect the child from use of the statements in the transfer proceedings.101 
                                                           
 
98 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
99 Id. 
100 See In re William M., 196 P.3d 456, 457 (Nev. 2008) (“[R]equiring a juvenile to admit to the charged 
criminal conduct in order to overcome the presumption of adult certification . . . violates the juvenile’s 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.”); Christopher P. v. State, 816 P.2d 485 (N.M. 1991) 
(holding that a juvenile’s Fifth Amendment rights were violated when the court compelled him to 
discuss the alleged offenses with a psychologist without the advice of counsel); Ramona R., 693 P.2d 
789 (holding that use immunity applies to statements a juvenile makes at a fitness hearing because, 
without it, the juvenile’s right against self-incrimination is violated). Cf. State ex rel. A.L., 638 A.2d 
814, 822 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (“There are no Fifth Amendment concerns where the threat of 
self-incrimination is removed by a grant of immunity.”). 
101 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6338(c)(1) (2006) provides: 
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that is undertaken in conjunction with any proceedings under this chapter, 
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1. Commonwealth v. Cotto 
In 1998, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania heard the case of Commonwealth 
v. Cotto.102 In Cotto, a juvenile, charged as an adult, challenged the 
constitutionality of the Juvenile Act. More specifically, the juvenile alleged that the 
statute unconstitutionally places the burden of proof on the juvenile to transfer his 
case from criminal to juvenile court.103 In rejecting this claim, the court referred to 
the New Jersey case State in Interest of A.L.104 In A.L., the New Jersey Superior 
Court held that the state’s transfer statute did not violate a juvenile’s right against 
self-incrimination because, even if an admission of guilt by the juvenile were 
required, that testimony is fully immunized and therefore he is “not penalized in 
any way by testifying at the transfer hearing.”105 The Cotto court noted that: 
The Pennsylvania Juvenile Act does not provide immunity to a juvenile 
testifying at his transfer hearing. Although the absence of such a provision does 
not affect our decision as to constitutionality, we believe that inclusion of an 
immunity provision would be prudent and merits legislative consideration.106 
Therefore, while the lack of immunity of the juvenile’s statements at this 
stage in the proceedings did not affect the court’s decision regarding 
constitutionality, specifically the juvenile’s claim that the burden was 
impermissibly placed on him, the court made clear that it would be wise for the 
legislature to immunize such statements. It is unclear how the court would have 
ruled if the juvenile had explicitly challenged the Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination issue. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
including but not limited to, that which is court ordered, shall be admitted 
into evidence against the child on the issue of whether the child committed a 
delinquent act under this chapter or on the issue of guilt in any criminal 
proceeding. 
Transfer proceedings do not determine whether the child committed a delinquent act, nor do they 
go toward the issue of guilt. Therefore, such proceedings are not included under this provision. 
102 Commonwealth v. Cotto, 708 A.2d 806 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). 
103 Id. at 813. 
104 A.L., 638 A.2d 814. 
105 Cotto, 708 A.2d at 815 n.3 (citing A.L., 638 A.2d at 822). 
106 Id. (emphasis added). 
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2. In the Matter of William M. 
Other jurisdictions have tackled the same issue that Jordan Brown faced more 
directly. Most recently, the Supreme Court of Nevada, in In the Matter of William 
M., ruled that requiring a juvenile to admit to a crime in order to overcome the 
presumption of adult certification violates the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.107 In that case, the seventeen-year-old defendant maintained his 
innocence, and the juvenile court found that he did not rebut the presumption of 
certification in adult court.108 As in Cotto, the court noted that the result of a 
transfer hearing is not an adjudication of guilt.109 However, as both the Supreme 
Court of Nevada and the California Supreme Court have recognized, “the 
certification of a juvenile offender to an adult court has been accurately 
characterized as ‘the worst punishment the juvenile system is empowered to 
inflict.’”110 While the statute in Nevada required a somewhat more explicit 
admission of guilt,111 the fact remains that the Pennsylvania statute has the same 
effect. By requiring the juvenile to take responsibility for his actions and show 
remorse in order to prove that he is amenable to treatment in the juvenile facility, 
the juvenile is implicitly required to admit guilt. 
3. Christopher P. v. State 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in Christopher P. v. State held that a 
juvenile’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated when the 
court ordered the child to discuss the charges against him during a psychological 
evaluation to be used to determine amenability to treatment in transfer 
proceedings.112 While the state of New Mexico contended that the transfer 
proceedings were nonadversarial and intended only to determine forum, not guilt, 
the court mimicked the sentiments of the Supreme Court of Nevada in William 
                                                           
 
107 In re William M., 196 P.3d 456, 457 (Nev. 2008). 
108 Id. at 458. 
109 Id. at 463. See also Cotto, 708 A.2d at 814. 
110 William M., 196 P.3d at 463 (citing Ramona R. v. Superior Court, 693 P.2d 789, 795 (Cal. 1985)). 
111 “The plain language of NRS 62B.390(3)(b) requires that a juvenile present clear and convincing 
evidence that his or her actions were substantially influenced by either substance abuse or emotional or 
behavioral problems. Accordingly, a juvenile must present evidence that his substance abuse or 
emotional or behavioral problems substantially influenced his commission of the charged criminal 
actions. In other words, to rebut the presumptive certification, the juvenile must incriminate himself.” 
William M., 196 P.3d at 464. 
112 Christopher P. v. State, 816 P.2d 485, 486 (N.M. 1991). 
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M.113 The court noted the impact of the transfer proceedings, stating that the 
transfer decision “does more than determine a judicial forum for an accused youth. 
It invokes a jurisprudential philosophy that governs the nature of the proceedings as 
well as the purpose and severity of the sanctions.”114 The court concluded that the 
protections of the Fifth Amendment extend to official questions in any kind of 
proceeding, the answers to which may incriminate the juvenile in future criminal 
proceedings.115 
4. Ramona R. v. Superior Court 
Finally, the Supreme Court of California addressed a similar issue in Ramona 
R. v. Superior Court, when it found that in order to comply with the constitutional 
protections of the Fifth Amendment, use immunity must apply to the state’s 
juvenile statute.116 In that case, the seventeen-year-old juvenile defendant was 
charged with brutally murdering her guardian.117 The child refused to be 
interviewed by a probation officer and declined to testify at the transfer hearing.118 
Furthermore, counsel for the defendant did not introduce into evidence a 
psychiatric evaluation of the child, as there was no immunity provision in place for 
potentially incriminating statements.119 In addition to recognizing that the lack of 
immunity subjected the child to the “cruel trilemma” of choosing between self-
incrimination, perjury, and contempt, the court noted that it also “impermissibly 
lighten[s]” the prosecution’s burden at the guilt phase.120 Finally, the court noted 
that although the result of the decertification hearing is not an adjudication of guilt, 
certification to adult court can have crippling consequences for the juvenile and his 
future.121 
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114 Id. at 487 (quoting Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elin Bloomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The 
Changing Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 323, 339 (1991)) 
(emphasis added). 
115 Id. at 487 (citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)). 
116 See 693 P.2d 789 (Cal. 1985). 
117 Id. at 791. 
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No Pennsylvania statute prohibits the use of incriminating statements made by 
a juvenile during decertification proceedings.122 While the Pennsylvania statute 
does not explicitly require or compel juveniles to admit to the crime, it implicitly 
compels the unfair choice of either admitting guilt to show amenability and stay in 
juvenile court or maintaining innocence and going to the adult criminal system. 
Therefore, the juvenile’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is called 
into question. Because the Pennsylvania statute has no immunity provision to 
protect the child, his constitutional rights are violated. Pennsylvania should enact 
such a provision in order to bring the Juvenile Act in conformity with the 
protections and policies of the right against self-incrimination. 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF REFORMING THE PENNSYLVANIA 
JUVENILE ACT 
Removing the implicit requirement that juveniles must admit to the crime to 
be decertified to juvenile court may result in the courts finding more juveniles 
amenable to treatment in the juvenile facility. While there are certainly arguments 
in support of certifying juveniles to the adult criminal system, the stronger 
arguments, especially in terms of policy and current societal norms, counsel in 
favor of keeping juveniles in the juvenile system. 
A. Children Are Psychologically Different Than Adults 
Many of the rationales for keeping juveniles in the juvenile system stem from 
the psychological differences between children and adults. Robert Schwartz, co-
founder of the Juvenile Law Center, has commented on the implications of Jordan 
Brown’s case and about juvenile transfers in general. Schwartz cites to a study by 
the MacArthur Foundation Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile 
Justice,123 which found that “teenagers are less blameworthy than adults, and that 
their capacities change significantly over the course of adolescence.”124 In other 
words, the study suggested that juveniles simply cannot process information and 
plan a crime like an adult.125 Schwartz goes on to state that during adolescence, 
children “struggle with their immaturity, undeveloped decision-making abilities, 
impulsiveness, lack of future orientation and susceptibility to negative peer 
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pressure.”126 He also points to scientific evidence drawn from brain imaging 
technology. This imaging shows that the teenage brain undergoes dramatic changes 
in several areas during adolescence, affecting adolescents’ ability to reason, weigh 
the consequences of decisions, and delay gratification long enough to make careful 
short- and long term choices.127 
United States Supreme Court jurisprudence mimics these sentiments 
regarding the psychological make-up of children. In Roper v. Simmons the 
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of capital punishment for 
juveniles.128 The Court ultimately held that it was a violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to impose the death penalty on offenders who were under 
the age of eighteen when they committed their crimes.129 In coming to its decision, 
the Court noted the differences in culpability between adults and children. Quoting 
the plurality opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma,130 the Court noted that “[t]he 
reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an 
adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally 
reprehensible.”131 Additionally, the Court agreed with the Thompson plurality’s 
determination that the death penalty did not have an impact as a deterrent on 
juveniles, as there is “a low likelihood that offenders under 16 engaged in ‘the kind 
of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution.’”132 
The Court also heavily relied upon the psychological differences between 
children and adults, noting three main differences. The first is a lack of maturity 
and underdeveloped sense of responsibility in juveniles as compared to adults;133 
the Court stated that this often leads juveniles to make “impetuous and ill-
considered actions and decisions.”134 Additionally, because of this, youths tend to 
act more recklessly than do adults.135 As evidence of the state-recognized 




128 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
129 Id. at 578. 
130 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
131 Roper, 543 U.S. at 561 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835). 
132 Id. at 561–62 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 836–38). 
133 Id. at 569. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
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differences between the maturity of juveniles and adults, the Court noted that 
children cannot vote, serve on juries, or marry without parental consent.136 
The second psychological divergence between juveniles and adults that the 
Court discussed is that youths are more susceptible to negative influences and peer 
pressure.137 This is due to the fact that youths do not have as much control over 
their own environment and surroundings.138 Lastly, the Court noted that the third 
difference between the psychological functioning of juveniles and adults is that the 
character of a juvenile is “not as well formed as that of an adult.”139 For these 
reasons, the Court found that children should not be subject to the death penalty. It 
noted that it would be wrong from a moral standpoint “to equate the failings of a 
minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character 
deficiencies will be reformed.”140 
Five years later, in Graham v. Florida, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of imposing a life sentence without the possibility of parole on a 
non-homicide juvenile offender.141 Relying on Roper, the Court reiterated that a 
juvenile’s behavior is “not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”142 The 
Court also pointed to several of the same arguments made in Roper, such as 
psychological evidence and the ineffectiveness of harsh punishment as a deterrent 
mechanism, as somewhat mitigating a juvenile’s behavior.143 Finally, in terms of 
rehabilitation, the Court found that a life imprisonment sentence without the 
possibility of parole would not achieve the goal of deterrence. It noted that “by 
denying the defendant the right to reenter the community, the State makes an 
irrevocable judgment on the person’s value and place in society. This judgment is 
not appropriate in light of a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s capacity for change 
and limited moral culpability.”144 





139 Id. at 570. 
140 Id. 
141 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
142 Id. at 2026. 
143 Id. at 2026–28. 
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Roper and Graham show the Court’s reluctance to treat juveniles and adults 
exactly the same way. Whether it be rooted in public policy or moral and societal 
standards, the cases show the Court struggling with, and ultimately finding against, 
subjecting juvenile offenders to certain aspects of the adult criminal justice system. 
The same reasoning applied in Roper and Graham can also be applied to modern 
juvenile transfer cases, such as that of Jordan Brown. 
B. Children Are Not Competent Defendants 
Furthermore, researchers at the MacArthur Network found an additional, but 
somewhat different, psychological reason why youths should not be tried in adult 
criminal court. That reason is that children are not competent enough to be 
defendants and can be likened to mentally ill persons not competent to stand trial. 
They lack adjudicative competence—that is, “the ability of a defendant to stand 
trial having ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 
degree of rational understanding, and whether he has a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him.’”145 The researchers argue that 
children lack the capacity and ability to consult with their attorneys and shape trial 
strategy.146 The Court in Graham considered this as well, finding that juveniles 
have “[d]ifficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding 
impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel.”147 
C. The Criminal Justice System May Do More Harm Than 
Good to Juveniles 
Finally, there is the fear that “young offenders given adult time will prove to 
be greater menaces to society when released after having learned the criminal ropes 
from older, tougher inmates.”148 Studies have shown that juveniles transferred to 
the adult criminal system had higher recidivism rates and in a shorter period of time 
than non-transferred juveniles.149 This has caused one observer to call the 
placement of juveniles into the adult system mere “cosmetic crime control.”150 
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Additionally, juveniles incarcerated in adult prisons are more likely to be 
physically and sexually abused by inmates than those in juvenile facilities.151 More 
specifically, approximately forty-six percent of juveniles in adult prisons are 
violently attacked; they are sexually assaulted at a rate five times higher than in 
juvenile facilities; they are physically abused by adult prison employees at twice 
the rate; and they are eight times more likely to commit suicide than minors in 
juvenile facilities.152 According to a study by Jeffrey Fagan, director of the Center 
for Violence Research and Prevention at Columbia University, juveniles who are 
sentenced to prison terms in the adult criminal system are “prisonized.”153 Fagan 
notes that “developmentally, their identities are very firmly and concretely molded 
as criminal offenders. And what they do not learn because they are locked up are 
the skills needed to become a family member, husband, neighbor or worker.”154 
As for Jordan Brown’s case, Robert Schwartz argues that the reasons to keep 
Brown in the juvenile system are really common sense.155 He states that if Jordan is 
adjudicated delinquent in juvenile proceedings, he will remain in the juvenile 
system until his twenty-first birthday. Schwartz states that this is “certainly long 
enough to serve the needs of public protection, and enough time to rehabilitate [an 
eleven-year-old] child.”156 He also notes that in cases such as these, the juvenile 
system is more effective at protecting the public against violent juvenile offenders 
than the adult criminal system.157 
D. Public Policy 
Public policy counsels in favor of decertifying minors to juvenile court. As 
stated by the Supreme Court in Graham, “every child under the age of eighteen . . . 
is entitled to the chance to ‘atone for his crimes and learn from his mistakes’ so that 
he may ‘demonstrate that the bad acts he committed as a teenager are not 
representative of his true character.’”158 The Court in Graham also noted that long 
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sentences, such as life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, are quite 
severe when applied to youth because “[a] 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each 
sentenced to life without parole receive the same punishment in name only.”159 In 
Pennsylvania, a concurrence in Kocher, authored by Justice Flaherty, expressed 
that Pennsylvania’s public policy would not allow for the criminal prosecution of a 
nine-year-old child.160 Justice Flaherty found the attempt at prosecuting a child as 
young as Cameron Kocher shocking to the conscience.161 Furthermore, scholars 
have criticized transfer laws on the basis that “there is little reason to believe that 
the juvenile system can accurately predict which juveniles are, indeed, beyond 
rehabilitative efforts and should therefore be remanded to the adult system in the 
name of public safety.”162 In light of our society’s evolving standards of 
decency,163 condemning extremely young children such as Jordan Brown to long, 
harsh sentences in the adult criminal system is contrary to American public policy 
and should be avoided whenever possible. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While reasonable minds may disagree as to whether Jordan Brown murdered 
Kenzie Houk, the Fifth Amendment guarantees his right to maintain his innocence. 
Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Act implicitly requires the juvenile to admit guilt in order 
to show amenability in the juvenile facility. Moreover, the statute contains no 
safeguards, such as immunity, to protect the child in the decertification hearing 
from incriminating statements he may make. The psychological differences 
between children and adults, along with issues concerning adjudicative 
competency, the effectiveness of the adult system on juveniles, and general public 
policy, counsel in favor of keeping juveniles in the juvenile system. The legislature 
in Pennsylvania should look to the evolving standards of decency in the United 
States in reforming the Pennsylvania Juvenile Act and protecting the Fifth 
Amendment rights of juveniles. As the original philosophy of the juvenile court 
system proclaimed, the state should not be an enemy of the child, but a protector 
and ultimate guardian.164 
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